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The Supreme Court and Commercial
Speech: New Words with an Old Message
Donald E. Lively*
The constitutional history of commercial speech1 has been
short but tortured. Only a decade ago, the Supreme Court
granted commercial speech first amendment protection.2 Since
then the Court has struggled to define the relative constitu-
tional status of commercial speech. In conferring first amend-
ment protection on commercial speech, the Court intimated
that government had no regulatory interest in truthful expres-
sion related to lawful activity.3 Later, however, the Court
found content control permissible, even if the speech was truth-
ful and the underlying activity lawful, provided the regulation
directly advanced a substantial state interest 4 and minimally
* Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo. The author thanks
Raneta Lawson for her helpful research assistance.
1. Commercial speech was originally defined as speech that proposes a
commercial transaction. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Commer-
cial speech also refers to "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). In theory the Supreme Court has dis-
tinguished commercial advertising from commercially motivated speech that
addresses noncommercial issues. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 786 & n.23 (1978). The distinction between those classifications,
however, is not necessarily clear. An investment newsletter, for example, may
constitute both an advertisement and a source of noncommercial information.
See SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 906 (2d Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
2. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (state law prohibiting the ad-
vertisement of prescription drug prices violated first amendment). The Court
had previously held that commercial speech did not merit first amendment
protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). For a discus-
sion of Chrestensen, see infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
3. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24, 773.
4. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 568-69. Earlier cases presaged a sub-
stantial interest test. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977)
(holding that first amendment protects truthful newspaper advertising of
availability and fees for routine legal services); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (invalidating prohibition of any advertisement or
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burdened first amendment interests.5 Under that analytical
formula, judicial scrutiny of regulation touching commercial
speech, although elevated, was not strict.6
Most recently, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co., 7 the Court further discounted the constitutional
value of commercial speech. Posadas concerned regulation re-
stricting casino gambling advertisements directed at Puerto Ri-
can residents but permitting such advertisements directed at
tourists.8 Although the advertisements related to a lawful ac-
tivity and were not false or misleading, the Court retreated to a
deferential standard of review reminiscent of thinking associ-
ated with its abandoned view that commercial expression is un-
protected. 9 Reversion to such analysis mocks the constitutional
display of contraceptives); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (holding first amendment prohibits municipality from ban-
ning "for sale" and "sold" signs on homes when town acted to prevent flight of
white homeowners from racially integrated town).
5. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-72. Despite concluding that commer-
cial speech was constitutionally protected, the Virginia Pharmacy Court justi-
fied a diminished first amendment status because such expression purportedly
is hardier and more easily verifiable than other first amendment speech. 425
U.S. at 777 n.24. That rationale, however, may apply with equal force to other,
fully protected forms of expression. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying
text.
6. Courts normally use the strict scrutiny standard when reviewing a
regulation that invades a fundamental right or intentionally creates a suspect
classification. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
531 (3d ed. 1986). Under strict scrutiny government action must be justified by
a compelling state interest. Id. at 530. Genuinely strict scrutiny has been char-
acterized as "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Opposite
the strict scrutiny standard is the rational basis test, characterized by judicial
deference to legislative judgment. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra,
at 530. Between these two poles lies an intermediate level of scrutiny which,
since commercial speech was afforded first amendment status, generally has
been used to review regulations touching commercial expression. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Intermediate review
has been described as an ad hoc balancing process that enables each Justice to
evaluate the importance of the government's interest and the substantiality of
the relationship between legislative means and ends. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra, at 670, 920.
7. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986). For a discussion of Posadas, see infra notes 63-
89 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 2972.
9. Traditional first amendment analysis requires the government to
demonstrate not merely a speculative rational basis, but a real and substantial
interest in the regulation. See id. at 2984 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By specu-
lating that the legislature could have found casino gambling harmful to the
public's health, safety, and welfare, however, the Court in Posadas adopted a
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status of commercial speech.10
The devaluation of commercial speech over the last decade
has not included any adequate refutation of the compelling ra-
tionales for first amendment protection. In affording first
amendment protection to commercial speech eleven years ago,
the Court recognized the value of the free flow of commercial
information in contemporary society.'1  The first amendment
assumes that access to information facilitates personal auton-
omy in decision making because individuals are free to choose
ideas from many, diverse sources. 12 When the government au-
thoritatively restricts speech, on the other hand, the public has
less information and therefore fewer choices. 13 As a result, the
deferential standard reminiscent of rational basis review. Id& at 2983 & n.3,
2984.
10. The Posadas Court's scrutiny of the Puerto Rican legislation seems
more akin to the review associated with other forms of speech that are ex-
cluded from the first amendment's ambit than with heightened scrutiny used
when protected speech is implicated. The Court subjects unprotected speech,
such as obscenity or fighting words, to categorical regulation. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is unprotected
speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
fighting words are unprotected speech). Courts need not even consider, there-
fore, whether a compelling, substantial, or even rational basis exists for regu-
lating such speech. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. While purporting to use a higher
level of scrutiny, the Court in Posadas actually seemed to apply a rational ba-
sis test to the Puerto Rican regulation. See 106 S. Ct. at 2976-77; infra notes
73-74, 77-81 and accompanying text. In practice such deference is not far re-
moved from the level of review applied to unprotected speech. Regulation
normally survives deferential rational basis scrutiny if the Court can construct
any conceivable basis for its existence. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1955); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Used especially in
assessing the constitutionality of economic regulation, rational basis review is
so forgiving that since its adoption nearly a half century ago, only one chal-
lenged legislative act has succumbed to its application. See Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457, 469 (1957) (holding that law regulating issuance of money orders by
all currency exchanges except one violated equal protection clause of four-
teenth amendment). The Court later overruled even that singular exception
to its deferential tendencies. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
306 (1976) (per curiam) (overruling Morey).
11. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
12. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944). The Court
noted that the first amendment assumes that "the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public." Id.
13. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Judge Learned Hand observed that:
[t]he dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with
as many different facets and colors as is possible.., is closely akin to,
if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First
1987]
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first amendment favors autonomous rather than authoritative
selection of information and assumes that intelligent decisions
are more likely when the decision maker's access to informa-
tion is at its greatest.14 By providing constitutional protection
to commercial speech, the Court recognized society's interest in
ensuring that private economic decisions are well informed. 15
The Court underscored its protection of economic information
by noting that commercial expression is as important for many
people as political expression. 16
The Court's opinion in Posadas undercuts these rationales.
Insofar as the Court defers to legislative judgment, commercial
speech does not rise much above its previous unprotected sta-
tus. In addition, the Court intimated in Posadas that the consti-
tutional status of commercial speech is tied to the constitutional
status of the underlying activity. 17 That linkage suggests an
even greater departure from traditional first amendment em-
phasis on autonomous rather than authoritative selection of
information.
The Posadas decision thus represents a perceptible and sig-
nificant devaluation of commercial speech. The Posadas Court
reduced the protection of commercial speech to a level not seen
since the era when commercial speech was excluded from the
first amendment's ambit. This Article questions that analytical
drift. Part I describes the elevation of commercial speech to
constitutionally protected status and discusses subsequent limi-
tations on that status. Part II examines Posadas and demon-
strates its resemblance to earlier decisions holding that
commercial speech was unprotected. While offering a princi-
pled basis for distinguishing commercial expression from fully
protected speech, Part III nevertheless recommends use of ex-
isting constitutional tools to require the least restrictive regula-
tory alternative that in turn would emphasize the marketplace
remedy of competing speech.
Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but
we have staked upon it our all.
Id.
14. Id. The framers of the first amendment contemplated the possibility
that people might be unable to evaluate the merits of conflicting arguments.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 & n.31, 792 (1978).
15. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
16. Id. at 763.
17. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968,
2979 (1986).
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I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A CONVOLUTED
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Until the 1970s the level of protection afforded commercial
speech attracted little discussion because the Court placed eco-
nomic expression outside the first amendment's ambit. In 1942
the Court determined in Valentine v. Chrestensen'I that the
first amendment did not preclude governmental regulation of
"purely commercial advertising." 19 Chrestensen is generally re-
garded as a relic because the Court has since abandoned its
holding and conferred first amendment protection on commer-
cial speech.
The abandonment of Chrestensen began with three deci-
sions during the 1970s that evinced movement toward a more
solicitous view of commercial speech. In Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell,20 the Court upheld a congressional ban on the
broadcasting of cigarette advertising.21 By so holding, the
Court intimated that a legislature may restrict truthful adver-
tising of legal activities it considers merely harmful.22 In Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,23 the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting a news-
paper's grouping of help-wanted advertisements by gender.24
The Court appeared to retreat, however, from Capital Broad-
casting's expansive interpretation of the commercial speech
doctrine by holding that states may prohibit the advertising of
only illegal activities.2 5 That holding led to the corollary princi-
18. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
19. Id. at 54.
20. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
21. Id. at 584. The diminished constitutional protection of the electronic
media further disposed the Court to uphold the ban. See id. at 584, 586 (noting
that "[t]he unique characteristics of electronic communication make it espe-
cially subject to regulation in the public interest").
22. See id. at 585-86. The Court has recently resurrected the Capital
Broadcasting notion that a legislature may ban advertising merely because it
considers the subject harmful. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2978-79 (1986). The Posadas Court's advertance to the Cap-
ital Broadcasting reasoning may suggest that the constitutional status of com-
mercial speech is waning. See also infra notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
23. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
24. Id at 391.
25. Id. at 388-89. Taking a much more expansive view, the Posadas Court
said that if a legislature may prohibit an otherwise lawful activity, it may also
ban advertisement of that activity even if the activity itself is not actually de-
clared illegal. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
1 R71 C'. T /f P.. R. TA T, .qP P.. EC-T
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pie, in Bigelow v. Virginia,26 that government may not prohibit
touting of a lawful activity.2 7 The Court asserted in Bigelow
that Chrestensen had merely affirmed a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction and had not immunized all regulation
of commercial speech from constitutional challenge. 28
That revisionist formulation of the Chrestensen doctrine
set the stage for rejection of the notion that commercial expres-
sion was beyond the first amendment's pale. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,29
the Court recognized the public's interest in the unfettered
flow of commercial speech 30 and therefore granted it first
amendment protection.31 By 1976 Cirestensen's exclusion of
commercial speech from the first amendment's purview was of-
ficially discredited.
Still, a significant feature of Chrestensen has endured. The
Chrestensen Court affirmed the conviction of a commercial ex-
hibitor who, in violation of a municipal ordinance, distributed a
handbill advertising the public display of a former Navy subma-
rine on one side and protesting the city's denial of docking facil-
ities on the other.32 The Court classified the handbill in
singular terms as commercial speech, even though it had both
commercial and political content.33 The inclination toward sin-
gular classification has not diminished despite the loftier status
26. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27. Id at 822. The Court in Bigelow invalidated a state statute banning
advertisements that "encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion." Id. at
812-13, 822. The Court found that the advertisements at issue went beyond
proposing a commercial transaction and contained factual material of public
interest. Id. at 822.
28. Id. at 819-20.
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. Id. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.").
31. Id. at 770, 773 (conferring first amendment protection upon the free
flow of truthful commercial information concerning lawful activity).
32. 316 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1942).
33. 316 U.S. at 52-53, 55 (refusing to "indulge nice appraisal based upon
subtle distinctions"). The Court reacted to the inclusion of a political message
in the leaflets as an attempt to circumvent the commercial speech doctrine.
Previous ordinances that sought to regulate the distribution of political hand-
bills had been invalidated. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 164
(1939) (holding that three ordinances banning handbill distribution in streets
and one ordinance establishing burdensome process to acquire permits violated
first amendment). The Court in Chrestensen, however, viewed the political
message accompanying the commercial advertisement as contrived and thus
incidental and irrelevant to a determination of the constitutionality of the
speech. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55.
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since afforded commercial speech. Expression containing mani-
festly political dimensions, for example, has been characterized
as commercial3 4 and therefore more vulnerable to regulation.
35
Since Chrestensen the Court has classified speech according to
its perception of the primary purpose of the expression.
36
Equal or important but secondary dimensions of expression
thus may be essentially disregarded.3 7
Courts classify multidimensional speech as commercial if
in their view it predominantly invites a commercial transaction
or relates to the economic interest of the speaker and audi-
ence. 38 Noneconomic functions of the speech thus may be ig-
nored. An investment newsletter, for example, may reflect
multiple dimensions of speech by propagating political as well
as economic and financial information.39 Nevertheless, if the
newsletter serves primarily to assess investment opportunities
and attract clients, it may be classified as commercial speech.
40
Expression, however, does not lend itself to such neat labels.
Even if an investment newsletter is classified as commercial
speech, the editorial process that produced the newsletter may
merit utmost first amendment protection.41 The Court's ability
to devalue expression it may conveniently characterize as com-
mercial is disquieting.
34. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (advertisements promoting
electricity consumption); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 532-35 & n.1 (1980) (advertisements promoting nuclear power); Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (advertisements encouraging abortion).
35. For example, although a state could not ban promotion of electricity
consumption altogether, it could "require that the advertisements include in-
formation about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both
under current conditions and for the foreseeable future." Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 571. Such regulation is modeled after the fairness doctrine which gov-
erned broadcasting until the Court recently abandoned it. See F.C.C. Votes
Down Fairness Doctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at 1, col.
6.
36. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-13 & n.11 (1979) (ignoring
secondary meaning of trade names).
37. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
38. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 907, 909 (2d Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (finding observations in investment
newsletter about economic and financial conditions "inextricably entwined"
with recommendations regarding stocks and issuers).
40. Id. at 896-97, 902.
41. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58
(1974) (holding that "right of reply" statute violated first amendment "because
of its intrusion into the function of editors").
1987]
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Both in Chrestensen and in modern analysis, the Court has
demonstrated that classifying speech is a perilous if not futile
exercise. Because categories of expression are often inter-
twined,42 the line-drawing process invites procrustean efforts to
force multidimensional speech into one arbitrary category.43
Such a process results in insensitive distinctions and a dimin-
ished status for complex expression. Despite having abandoned
the holding of Chrestensen, the Court has retained speech clas-
sification methodology as a troublesome force in contemporary
commercial speech analysis.
Notwithstanding the explicit conferral of constitutional sta-
tus on commercial speech, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy re-
fused to afford commercial speech first amendment parity.44
Instead, the Court justified stricter regulation of otherwise pro-
tected commercial speech 45 because it assumed commercial
speech to be a hardier breed of speech, the truth of which "may
be more easily verifiable by its disseminator. '46
Reliance on hardiness and verifiability to justify disparate
constitutional standing is unsatisfactory, however, because
those rationales are subject to numerous exceptions. The har-
diness rationale underestimates the resiliency of political
speech. Campaign rhetoric, for example, is at least as hardy as
commercial expression. 47 Although the profit motive is often a
persistent impetus for commercial speech, the desire to be
elected is a potent motivating force for political expression. If
first amendment status hinges on resiliency, campaign rhetoric
42. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring); SEC
v. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 907 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
43. In Lowe v. SEC, for example, an investment newsletter addressed
commercial, political, social, and economic matters. 472 U.S. 181, 185 & n.7
(1985). The SEC urged the Court to classify the newsletter as commercial
speech, while the publisher asked the Court to characterize it as noncommer-
cial speech. Id. at 233-34 (White, J., concurring). The Court did not reach the
classification issue. Id. at 208-09.
44. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court, referring to "commonsense differ-
ences" between commercial and other forms of speech, concluded "that a dif-
ferent degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." Id.
45. The Court observed, for example, that government might insist on
warnings, disclosure, or disclaimers, and that commercial speech might be
more vulnerable to prior restraint. Id.
46. Id. at 772 n.24.
47. Political advertisements, like commercial advertisements, are deliv-
ered persistently and effectively to the individual. See Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 528 n.9 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Television and radio enable
well-financed candidates to go directly into the homes of voters far more effec-
tively than even the most well-organized 'political machine.' ").
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should be afforded diminished protection. The hardiness ra-
tionale thus fails to draw a satisfactory distinction between
commercial and other types of speech. Moreover, even assum-
ing commercial speech is more resilient than other types of ex-
pression, regulation might neutralize its hardiness by
effectively deterring otherwise durable types of commercial
speech.48
The second rationale, that commercial speech is more eas-
ily verifiable and therefore more easily regulated, is equally
misguided. A false and misleading commercial advertisement is
not necessarily more verifiable than a false and misleading
political campaign promise. Promoters in either category can
misrepresent the nature of their services. To the extent that
either shortchanges the truth to obtain money or votes, the au-
thentication problems are comparable.
Despite the weaknesses of the hardiness and verifiability
rationales, the Court has relied on them to relegate commercial
speech to a diminished first amendment status. Although the
Court refused to allow a state to ban advertising by electric
utilities, for example, it did so using an intermediate level of re-
view.49 Moreover, the Court noted that states could require ad-
vertisements to include information concerning relative
efficiency and cost.50 Such balancing of competing first amend-
ment and regulatory interests51 has yielded fluctuating, diver-
gent results.52 Devaluating commercial speech by labeling it
48. Regulations that dictate the content of speech may enforce their re-
quirements with penalties that destroy any resilient efforts to defy the regula-
tion. The offer and sale of securities, for example, are conditioned on approval
by the SEC of the content of offering materials. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 5(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (1982) (prohibiting offer and sale of securities
unless a registration statement has been filed). Until the editorial content of
filing and promotional materials complies with official demands, the securities
may not be offered or sold. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 67-69 (1985) (discussing "requirements of full disclosure and accuracy
that can prevent a registration statement from becoming effective").
49. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (invalidating state regulation that banned all public utility ad-
vertising which promoted the use of electricity). Justice Blackmun, in his con-
curring opinion, explicitly characterized the Court's review as an intermediate
level of review. Id. at 573.
50. Id. at 571.
51. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 920 (noting
that "the Court... will engage in a series of ad hoc decisions as to the permis-
sible scope of regulation of commercial speech").
52. For example, balancing of first amendment and regulatory interests
has led to divergent results in cases involving attorney advertising. In Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the
1987]
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according to its dominant purpose might produce consistency, if
carried far enough,5 3 but only if courts apply an even more def-
erential standard of review that regularly favors legislative
judgment.54
The constitutional recognition of commercial speech was
accompanied by the limiting principle that commonsense differ-
ences exist between it and other forms of expression.55 Those
differences, however, seem rooted more in some inexplicable
common wisdom than in verifiable reality.56 The Court has
first amendment did not shield an attorney from discipline for in-person solici-
tation of a prospective personal injury client. Id. at 467. In a like case decided
the same day, however, the Court held that the first amendment did protect
an attorney from discipline for in-person solicitation of a civil rights client on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439
(1978). Thus, the constitutionality of regulations concerning attorney advertis-
ing may depend on whether the advertising is directed to the public or consti-
tutes potentially more coercive face-to-face solicitation. See Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 464-66. The danger of fraud, deception, or overreaching in in-person solici-
tation altered the mix of first amendment and regulatory interests in favor of
regulation. Id. Solicitation by nonprofit associations such as the ACLU or
NAACP, on the other hand, is more freely approved because political and ide-
ological goals are presumedly less likely to engender wrongdoing than private
pecuniary gain and because such solicitation is a form of political speech. See
Primus, 436 U.S. at 435-39.
53. The Court, for example, has noted that trade names have a "strictly
business" purpose and convey no real information. Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (finding that trade names are a "form of commercial speech
that has no intrinsic meaning"). In adopting this deferential approach, how-
ever, the Friedman Court ignored the function of trade names in conveying
information about the quality of the products and services offered. Id. at 22-23
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court's view gives government more power to
regulate commercial speech. See id. at 15.
54. The Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., for exam-
ple, applied a deferential approach to uphold a ban on advertising of an activ-
ity that the legislature could have determined was harmful, even though the
government had not proved it was harmful. 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977 (1986). In
dissenting Justice Brennan criticized the majority's deferential approach as an
unwarranted departure from first amendment jurisprudence, which tradition-
ally requires elevated review. See id. at 2984; supra note 9.
55. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56 (noting that although first amendment pro-
tection has been extended to commercial speech, the Court recognizes com-
mercial speech is different from other forms of speech in ways that may limit
its protection); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (noting that commercial speech is "more
easily verifiable" and "more durable" than other forms of speech); supra note
44.
56. The Court frequently refers to commonsense differences between
commercial and other forms of speech but rarely describes those differences.
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (quoting Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771
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used purported attributes of commercial speech such as hardi-
ness and verifiability 57 to insist on disclosure or disclaimers 58
and to negate the traditional presumption against prior re-
straint.59 The differences between commercial and other forms
of speech relied on to limit constitutional protection of com-
mercial speech are neither convincing nor satisfying.60 The
Court's most recent statement on commercial speech augments
those inadequacies with an even more troubling regulatory
premise.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EMERGING VIEW OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH: REHABILITATING
DISCREDITED DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's most recent observations are remi-
niscent, at least in critical part, of the disregard for commercial
speech reflected in Valentine v. Chrestensen6' and its progeny.
For the first time since the shelving of Chrestensen, the Court,
in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 62 en-
couraged official restraint of truthful information regarding a
lawful activity.63 The Court held that a legislature may ban ex-
pression concerning an activity it considers harmful, even if not
made illegal, because "the greater power to completely ban ca-
sino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban ad-
vertising of casino gambling. '64
n.24); infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Even arguments for greater
protection of commercial speech acknowledge rather than challenge those pur-
ported differences. See, e.g., Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2981 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
57. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; supra text accompanying
notes 46-47.
58. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; supra note 45.
59. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
60. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
61. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a description of Chrestensen's approach to com-
mercial speech, see supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
62. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
63. Id. at 2981 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Posadas approach to truthful
information regarding a lawful activity reflects the disregard for commercial
speech that preceded the Virginia Pharmacy recognition of constitutional pro-
tection. See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attor-
ney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (upholding a ban on cigarette advertising and
suggesting legislature may restrict truthful advertising of legal, harmful activ-
ity); supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 2979. The Posadas Court also suggested that it would be a "Pyr-
rhic victory for casino owners" to gain a first amendment right "only to
thereby force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents alto-
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The Posadas opinion presented a new predicate for dimin-
ishing the constitutional security of commercial expression. In
upholding a ban on advertisement of legal activity,65 the
Posadas Court distinguished its holding from earlier decisions
invalidating bans on contraceptive 66 and abortion67 advertise-
ments on the ground that abortion and the use of contracep-
tives were constitutionally protected but gambling was not.68
By making that distinction, the Court introduced the newly re-
strictive notion that the first amendment bars official abridg-
ment of advertising only when the underlying activity is not
constitutionally protected. 69 Few products, services, or activi-
ties are without potential for harm. Many are not constitution-
ally protected. Measuring first amendment protection
according to the constitutional status of the underlying activity,
therefore, represents a check on legislative power that may
prove illusory.70 In any event the Court has significantly de-
parted from its earlier holding treating commercial speech dif-
ferently only to the extent necessary to facilitate an
unimpaired flow of truthful and legitimate information. 71
The Posadas Court also diluted the standard for judicial
gether." Id. That observation is misleading. The first amendment has never
been read to safeguard advertisement of an illegal activity or false or mislead-
ing expression. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). The Court could have
avoided overextending its analysis by confining the focus to genuine legislative
action rather than unexercised power.
65. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
66. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (invalidat-
ing law prohibiting advertisement or display of contraceptives).
67. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 829 (1975) (invalidating law
prohibiting a profit-making organization's advertisement offering to arrange
for legal out-of-state abortions).
68. 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
69. The Court referred to the constitutionally protected liberty to use con-
traceptives or have an abortion as "a crucial distinction." Id.
70. The premise that first amendment protection of advertising depends
on whether the underlying activity is constitutionally safeguarded would seem
to enable government to prohibit not only advertising of liquor, cigarettes,
chain saws, snowmobiles, and other harmful products, but also advertising
with political dimensions, such as promotion of nuclear power. Because educa-
tion is not a fundamental right, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973), prohibition of advertising by schools that are
unaccredited, for example, might be justified.
71. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (noting that commercial speech requires




scrutiny of commercial speech. The Court professed loyalty to
an elevated standard of review requiring that the regulation di-
rectly advance a substantial state interest and restrict speech
no more than necessary.7 2 While purportedly applying this con-
stitutional standard, the Court concluded that the legislature
could decide which regulatory alternative would best serve its
end.73
The Court thus appeared to adopt a deferential posture to-
ward legislative judgment in addition to overlooking less re-
strictive alternatives available to the commonwealth. If
genuinely concerned with social harm from casino gambling,
Puerto Rico could monitor casino operations to guard against
infiltration by organized crime, aggressively enforce relevant
criminal statutes, and promulgate competing speech calculated
to discourage participation by residents. 74 The availability of
less restrictive alternatives led the Court just a few years ear-
lier to conclude that government could not completely suppress
commercial speech even if acting to further "an imperative na-
tional goal." 75 The Posadas Court's refusal to insist on less re-
strictive alternatives thus represents a step backward in
commercial speech doctrine.
The deference to legislative judgment apparent in Posadas
seems closer in spirit to Chrestensen and its progeny than to
later decisions that discredited them.76 During the Chrestensen
era, commercial speech was not constitutionally protected. Ab-
sent a fundamental constitutional interest, the Court normally
applied a rational basis test that deferred to legislative policy. 77
72. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980). In determining that reducing
the demand for gambling would promote the commonwealth's valid interests
in protecting its citizens from crime and the disruption of moral and cultural
patterns, 106 S. Ct. at 2977, the Court applied a diminished standard of review.
73. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2977.
74. See id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Requiring dissemination of
information discouraging casino gambling would have been a less restrictive
alternative similar to the alternative required in Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
570 (requiring that advertisements include information about relative effi-
ciency and expense of offered service). The Posadas Court did not require
such an alternative, even though it purportedly relied on Central Hudson,
which stands for the first amendment requirement of less restrictive alterna-
tives. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
75. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71 (public interest in energy conserva-
tion insufficient to ban advertising by electric utility because less restrictive al-
ternatives available).
76. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 10.
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That approach contrasts with the intermediate level of review
used in later commercial speech cases in which the Court de-
manded proof of a substantial state interest.78 In affirming the
ban on casino gambling advertising, and particularly by con-
cluding that Puerto Rico could have found the underlying activ-
ity harmful to the citizenry and thus prohibited it, 79 the
Posadas Court seems to have retreated to a rational basis level
of review. Speculation concerning legislative purpose denotes
use of the rational basis test. 0 The Court's reliance upon its
own conjecture and surmise is especially glaring, because the
Puerto Rican legislature expressed no concern that the under-
lying activity would harm local citizens.8 1
The Court's present posture toward commercial speech, as
expressed in Posadas, deviates from first amendment standards
that are designed to prevent "highly paternalistic" intrusions by
the state which would limit information available to the pub-
lic.8 2 Until Posadas the Court was unwilling to tolerate laws
reflecting government concern that the public might act irra-
tionally on truthful information concerning a lawful activity.8 3
First amendment jurisprudence traditionally holds the public
78. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985) (finding state interests insufficient to justify prophylactic rule banning
use of legal advice in advertisements by attorneys); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
205-06 (1982) (finding state interests insufficient to reprimand attorney for
truthful advertisements that deviated from precise listing of areas of practice
allowed by state); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (holding that although state
had substantial interest in conserving energy and reducing electric rates, ban-
ning all utility advertisements did not advance those interests); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (holding that state had substantial interest in
preventing misleading practices tending to arise from trade names).
79. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979
(1986). The majority speculated on legislative concerns about gambling, even
though the legislature legalized gambling for tourists and residents. See id- at
2983 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The "Statement of Motives" prefacing the chal-
lenged gambling law asserted only an interest in fostering tourism and creat-
ing a revenue source for the state. Id. at 2983 n.2 (citing Games of Chance Act
of 1948, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1972)). No suggestion was made in the
"Statement of Motives" that gambling by residents was undesirable or would
subvert the stated purposes of the Act. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 71.
80. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2984 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 2983 & n.2; supra note 80.
82. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978).
83. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2981 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 n.31 ("Government is forbidden to assume the task of
ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves.");
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1977) (holding
ordinance prohibiting posting of "For Sale" signs unconstitutional, even
though municipality acted to prevent perceived flight of white homeowners
from racially integrated community).
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responsible for evaluating information8 4 and for making deci-
sions by means of autonomous rather than authoritative selec-
tion. 5  Virginia Pharmacy integrated that principle into
modern commercial speech doctrine.8 6 The Court later recog-
nized that the first amendment accepts the risk that the public
might exercise poor judgment or even be deceived.8 7 Neverthe-
less, the holding in Posadas allows states to regulate commer-
cial speech to protect the public from itself.8 8 The Court thus
has constructed a premise for undoing many of the constitu-
tional gains made for commercial speech during the past
decade.
Experience suggests that bans on commercial speech may
harm not only constitutional but regulatory interests. In 1967
the Federal Communications Commission, for example, or-
dered broadcasters to balance the airing of cigarette advertise-
ments with competing programming focusing on the dangers of
smoking.8 9 Most broadcast licensees complied with the require-
ment by airing messages that graphically delineated the risks
of smoking.90 The agency's competing speech requirement
facilitated autonomous decision making9 ' and, because of the
"devastating effect [of antismoking messages] on cigarette con-
84. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 ("[Ihe people in our democracy are
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits
of conflicting arguments.").
85. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. The Court in Cohen v.
California noted that "[t]he constitutional right of free expression . . . is
designed and intended to . .. [place] the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us." 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (overturn-
ing conviction for breach of the peace based on defendant's wearing a jacket,
bearing an expletive, in a courthouse).
86. In recognizing commercial speech as a constitutionally protected form
of expression, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council observed that the first amendment contemplates that
"people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed, and.., the best means to that end is to open the channels of commu-
nication, rather than to close them." 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
87. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 ("If there be any danger that the people can-
not evaluate the information and arguments advanced [to them], it is a danger
contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.").
88. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
89. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upholding
FCC decision requiring broadcasters to set aside time for programming con-
cerning the hazards of smoking), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
90. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C.
1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) (noting that the nature of antismoking advertise-
ments had a "devastating effect on cigarette consumption").
91. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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sumption,"92 also furthered regulatory interests. The less re-
strictive alternative to a complete ban was so successful that
the tobacco industry itself supported a ban on radio and televi-
sion advertising of its product.93 The cigarette advertising epi-
sode, therefore, suggests that the Court's new posture not only
devalues first amendment rights but also undercuts regulatory
interests.
III. DIFFERENTIATING COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
PRINCIPLED BUT PROBLEMATICAL
DISTINCTIONS
The Court has observed that the commonsense differences
between commercial speech and other forms of expression jus-
tify diminished first amendment protection of commercial
speech.94 The curtailed first amendment status of commercial
speech until recently was based on the assumptions that eco-
nomic expression is hardier and more verifiable than other
speech.95 The Court has since justified limited scrutiny of com-
mercial speech regulation because of the government's broader
power to control the underlying activity.96 At least the hardi-
ness and verifiability rationales are based on the Court's in-
stincts regarding differences in the forms of expression rather
than on verifiable evidence. 97 If commercial speech is entitled
to first amendment security, limits placed upon that protection
should rest upon more satisfactory grounds than the Court so
far has articulated.
The Court has constructed a first amendment value system
largely reflecting Alexander Meiklejohn's theory that political
expression is most deserving of constitutional protection.98
92. Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 588.
93. "With the cigarette smoking controversy removed from the air, the
decline in cigarette smoking was abruptly halted .... Whereas the . . . re-
quire[ment] that both sides of the controversy [be aired] significantly de-
pressed cigarette sales .... ban[ning] the controversy from the [air] had the
reverse effect." Id. at 589. The advertising ban thus constituted a "legislative
coup for the tobacco industry." Id.
94. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 45-49, 56-61 and accompanying text.
98. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POW-
ERS OF THE PEOPLE 73-75 (1960) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM]. According
to Meiklejohn, the purpose of the first amendment is "to give to every voting
member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understand-
ing of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must
deal." Id. at 75. See also Mieklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
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Placing speech relating to self-government at the top of the
first amendment hierarchy is consistent with the importance
that the Court places on personal and property rights.9 9 Mod-
ern constitutional analysis employs a deferential standard of re-
view to legislation touching commercial interests10 0 while
reserving more exacting scrutiny for legislation affecting indi-
vidual rights. 0 1
If a distinction between commercial and other forms of
speech is desired, therefore, first amendment theory tied to
general constitutional jurisprudence affords one. Commercial
speech might be differentiated because, unlike political expres-
sion, it generally pertains less directly to self-government and
is associated with matters evoking less constitutional concern.
That basis for distinction might require de-emphasis of the
Court's observation that for many people commercial speech
may be more valuable than political expression. 10 2 The Court
could probably discount that notion readily, however, because it
is already apparent that practical value does not necessarily
translate into constitutional value.103
Another basis for differentiating commercial from political
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255 ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'free-
dom to speak' [but] the freedom of those activities of thought and communica-
tion by which we 'govern.' ").
99. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 8-6 to 9-5, at 446-67
(1978).
100. During the early part of this century, the Court used a form of judicial
review known as Lochnerism to strike down federal and state social and eco-
nomic regulation. See Lochner v. New YorK, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner
and its progeny, the Court found that such legislation violated the liberty com-
ponent of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See, e.g., id at 53.
At least with respect to commercial legislation, the Court has long since
abandoned Lochnerism. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955) (upholding ban on eyeglass advertisements by optometrists and
opthalmologists); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109
(1949) (upholding ban on advertisements placed on moving vehicles); Lincoln
Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 530 (1949)
(upholding law prohibiting employers from contracting to exclude nonunion
employees); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (adopting rational basis test for "regulatory legislation affecting ordi-
nary commercial transactions").
101. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (refusing to
apply equal protection analysis to exclusively economic legislation); see also
supra note 10.
102. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
103. The Court affords commercial speech less protection than political
speech even if the former may have greater practical value. See supra notes
16, 44 and accompanying text.
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expression, at least to the extent either is false, is that harm at-
tributable to commercial speech may be less avoidable and
more damaging than harm attributable to political expression.
A commercial message is more likely to be delivered face-to-
face than a political message. Unlike a political lie, which com-
peting candidates or media scrutiny may flesh out,104 a decep-
tive sales pitch may be less public and therefore less subject to
competing expression.
Injury from a false commercial advertisement affecting an
individual decision to purchase, moreover, generally will be
more direct than harm from a false political promise affecting
group decisions to vote. As with any rule, however, exceptions
exist. A false campaign promise not to engage in foreign hostili-
ties or raise taxes may translate into direct harm for persons
who relied on the representation and voted for the candidate.
Unlike harm resulting from individual reliance on a commer-
cial misrepresentation, however, the injury resulting from a
false campaign promise stems from the combined voting prefer-
ence of other citizens. Those individuals may have been influ-
enced by factors other than the misrepresentation. In addition,
public reliance on the false statement may have been insuffi-
cient to affect election results. Because the collective action of
voting is subject to more diverse influences than an individual
decision to purchase, the linkage between cause and harm is
weaker in the political than the commercial context.
Political speech also may differ from commercial speech
because false political statements, as opposed to untrue com-
mercial statements, may have more value in informed decision
making. In propounding his developmental theory of democ-
racy, 0 5 John Stuart Mill noted that competition among ideas,
whether true or false, strengthened truth, compelled the con-
tinuous reevaluation of ideas, and facilitated principles based on
reason rather than prejudice. 0 6 Even false political statements
104. See generally Lively, The Supreme Court's Emerging Vision of False
Speech: A First Amendment Blind Spot, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 479, 494-97 (1986)
(arguing that false or excessive rhetoric in a political campaign may
strengthen political process by capturing attention and engendering
discussion).
105. See C. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 51
(1977) (summarizing Mill's model of a society of "exerters and developers of
their human capacities"). John Stuart Mill theorized that democracy would
"make people more active, more energetic; it would advance them 'in intellect,
in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency.'" Id. (describing Mill's ver-
sion of democracy).
106. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 19-67 (C. Shields rev. ed. 1976) (1859).
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may have inherent value in promoting informed decision mak-
ing.107 Commercial speech seems less likely to facilitate any of
those ends. 0 8 Requiring more accuracy in commercial expres-
sion thus might be less offensive to the first amendment value
placed on competition among ideas in a democracy.1 0 9
The existence of a more principled basis for distinguishing
the value of speech forms, however, does not necessarily merit
its employment. A theoretical premise that more satisfactorily
measures comparable worth of speech does not, for example,
eliminate the treacheries of labeling speech.' 10 In addition to
complicating or preventing analysis of the worth of speech in
its context, singular labeling overlooks the multidimensional
nature of much speech. Political fundraising, for instance,
would remain susceptible to denomination as political or com-
mercial expression."' z
The dangers of an arbitrary or singular labeling process are
enhanced by the Court's inclination to establish a hierarchy of
speech rights reflecting its perception of the social utility of ex-
pression. That disposition makes first amendment protection
largely a function of the majority's first amendment dogma.1 2
The Court's decision in Posadas, for example, is a triumph for
107. See Lively, supra note 105, at 494-97.
108. But see id at 492-93 (noting that the banking system's integrity may
depend on false statements that a bank is sound and will remain in business).
109. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 106, at 51.
110. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620, 641-42 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Schaumburg the Court invali-
dated an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation by charitable organiza-
tions that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes. Id.
at 636-38. The Court distinguished charitable solicitation from purely commer-
cial speech because such solicitation "does more than inform private economic
decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services." Id. at 636. Justice Rehnquist
warned that the decision would require courts to make impossible decisions re-
garding what is and is not of public concern. Id. at 641-42.
In addition, official lines drawn between political and commercial speech
are as subject to gerrymandering as those between political and indecent
speech. The Court, for example, classified a social satire as indecent speech
and thus subjected it to stricter regulation. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding power of FCC to regulate radio broadcast that
is indecent but not obscene).
112. The Court's preference for one value system over another defines the
contours of first amendment rights. For example, in reaffirming the validity
of fairness regulation in broadcasting but denying a public right of access to
radio and television, the Court predicated its decision on society's interest in
informed decision making. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
122 (1973) (quoting POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 99, at 26). A preference
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice Rehnquist's previously rejected views that if com-
mercial speech merits any constitutional protection, the stan-
dard of judicial review should be minimal.113 Imposing a rigid
value system on first amendment analysis, however, endangers
diversity interests traditionally associated with the first amend-
ment. An exclusive labeling process forces some expression
into the category of commercial speech even though it shapes a
person's view of the world and thus contributes to the collec-
tive knowledge from which decisions are made."1 4 Even the
value of a patently commercial appeal may depend on a per-
son's perspective. 115 Experience suggests that the Court should
be wary of reflexively using seemingly commonsense or conve-
nient categorical distinctions that may be subjectively or insen-
sitively drawn."l 6
Rather than persisting with overly simplistic categorical
line drawing, the Court should craft standards that give due re-
gard to both first amendment and regulatory interests. That
objective can be facilitated with existing constitutional tools.
Risk assumption models premised on opportunity for response,
for example, have demonstrated utility in various speech con-
texts. -1 7 Imminence, likelihood, and irreparability of harm, tied
to activity that itself is unlawful, have been appropriate focal
for individual self-fulfillment presumably would have led to a result in favor
of access.
113. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 783-84 (1976) (noting that public interest in the free flow
of commercial information is a concern of the state legislature and not a con-
stitutional concern).
114. See Mininberg, Circumstances Within Our Control: Promoting Free-
dom of Expression Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 551,
591 (1984) ("[P]olitical values result from cultural conditioning involving a vast
range of issues and events .... [E]verything portrayed on television [includ-
ing] situation comedies, athletic events, soap operas, commercials, [and] news
programs... potentially contributes to an individual's view of the world.").
115. Television commercials in France, for example, are valued for artistic
reasons. Consequently, a significant segment of the audience values them
more highly than the programming that they sponsor. Smart, French Com-
mercials-Something to Savor, Even in Theaters and a Museum, Christian Sci.
Monitor, May 13, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
116. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (noting that the line be-
tween commercial and other forms of speech "will not always be easy to draw"
and may be "based in part on the motive of the speaker and the character of
the expressive activity").
117. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
844-45 (1978) (contempt of court); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
562-63 (1976) (prejudicial pretrial publicity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (speech promoting unlawful political ends).
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points for determining whether expression may be regulated.-1 8
Such standards have guided analysis of whether the opportu-
nity exists for competing speech to prevent or mitigate the
harm of a given expression.
The competing interests in cases concerning commercial
speech are amenable to like evaluation. Instead of employing
misplaced notions of durability, verifiability, or power to regu-
late an underlying activity, a more constitutionally sensitive
test should consider the opportunity to counter false, mislead-
ing, or harmful expression. Regulation should be prohibited if
competitors, critics, or government are available to present a
contrasting viewpoint. If the Puerto Rican legislature were
truly concerned about adverse effects of gambling on local citi-
zens, for example, the Court could have insisted that the legis-
lature facilitate competing speech rather than ban expression.
Only if a timely response was impossible would regulatory ac-
tion be appropriate. Even then, any government action would
have to consider less restrictive alternatives to prohibition.
CONCLUSION
Commercial speech has never received the same degree of
first amendment protection granted other forms of protected
speech. Although the Supreme Court eventually recognized
the public's interest in commercial information, the Court has
qualified the constitutional protection afforded such expression
pursuant to rationales that are unconvincing. The Court's sub-
sequent devaluation of commercial speech in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., moreover, seems a regression
toward an era when commercial speech was excluded entirely
from the first amendment's ambit.
To minimize the dangers inherent in line drawing and
avoid ascribing a singular label to expression that may possess
multiple dimensions, the Court should refrain from translating
perceived practical differences between commercial and polit-
ical speech into constitutional distinctions. Consistent with
traditional first amendment analysis, regulation should be per-
mitted only if less restrictive alternatives, including competitive
speech, are not workable. Such thinking is more consistent
with particularized scrutiny of speech value than with over-
broad categorical assumptions of worth. It also recognizes that
118. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 n.13 (1978) (not-
ing that the "immediacy of particular communication and the imminence of
harm... have made certain communications less protected than others").
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the pursuit of state concerns can proceed coextensively with,
rather than at the expense of, the protection of first amend-
ment interests.
